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Abstrat. We introdue a proess algebra with proesses able to mi-
grate between dierent expliit loations of a distributed environment
dened by a number of spatially distint loations. We use timing on-
straints to ontrol migration and ommuniation, and loal loks and
loal maximal parallelism of ations. Two proesses may ommuniate
if they are present in the same loation and, in addition, they have ap-
propriate aess permissions (put or get) to ommuniate over a shared
hannel. Aess permissions an be aquired or removed while moving
from one loation to another. Timing onstraints oordinate and ontrol
both the ommuniation between proesses and migration between lo-
ations. We ompletely haraterize those situations when a proess is
always guaranteed to possess safe aess permissions. In this way one
an design systems in whih proesses are not bloked (deadloked) due
to the lak of dynamially hanging aess permissions.
Keywords: distributed systems, seurity, ommuniation, migration,
safe aess permission, operational semantis, soundness, ompleteness.
1 Introdution
The inreasing omplexity of mobile appliations in whih the timing aspets
are important to the systems means that the need for a sound theoretial ap-
proah and their eetive analysis and veriation is beoming ritial. In this
paper we explore formal modelling of mobile systems where one an speify time-
related aspets of migrating proesses in distributed systems with loal loks
and maximal parallelism of ations. Proesses have appropriate aess rights
to ommuniate; the aess permissions are dynami and an hange. We pro-
vide an operational semantis of this model, and investigate the ruial seurity
aspets expressed by aess permissions to ommuniation hannels. Building
on our previous work presented at FASE'08 [10℄ and FM'11 [11℄, we desribe
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PerTiMo (Permissions, Timers and Mobility) whih is a proess algebra sup-
porting proess migration (strong mobility), loal interproess ommuniation
over shared hannels ontrolled by aess permissions that proesses must pos-
sess, and timers (driven by loal loks) ontrolling the exeution of ations.
An important feature of the proposed model is that aess permissions are dy-
nami. More preisely, proesses an aquire new aess permissions, or lose
some of their urrent aess permissions while moving from one loation to an-
other, modelling an important seurity feature. Proesses are equipped with
input and output apabilities whih are ative up to pre-dened time deadlines
and, if these ommuniations are not taken, alternative ontinuations for the
proess behaviour are followed. Another timing onstraint allows one to speify
the latest time for moving a proess from one loation to another. These two
kinds of timing onstraints help in the ontrol and oordination of migration
and ommuniation in distributed systems. We provide the syntax and opera-
tional semantis of PerTiMo whih is a disrete time semantis inorporating
maximally parallel exeutions of ations using loal loks.
To introdue the basi omponents of PerTiMo, we use a TravelShop run-
ning example in whih a lient proess attempts to pay as little as possible for
a tiket to a pre-dened destination. The senario involves ve loations and six
proesses. The role of eah of the loations is as follows:
 home is a loation where the lient proess starts and ends its journey;
 travelshop is a main loation of the servie whih is initially visible to the
lient;
 standard and special are two internal loations of the servie where lients
an nd out about the tiket pries; and
 bank is a loation where the payment is made.
The role of eah of the proesses is as follows:
 client is a proess whih initially resides in the home loation, and is deter-
mined to pay for a ight after omparing two oers (standard and speial)
provided by the travel shop. Upon entering the travel shop, client reeives
the loation of the standard oer and, after moving there and obtaining this
oer, the lient is given the loation where a speial oer an be obtained.
After that client moves to the bank and pays for the heaper of the two
oers, and then returns bak to home .
 agent rst informs client where to look for the standard oer and then moves
to bank in order to ollet the money from the till. After that agent returns
bak to travelshop.
 flightinfo ommuniates the standard oer to lients as well as the loation
of the speial oer.
 saleinfo ommuniates the speial oer to lients together with the loation
of the bank. saleinfo an also aept an update by the travel shop of the
speial oer.
 update initially resides at the travelshop loation and then migrates to special
in order to update the speial oer.
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 till resides at the bank loation and an either reeive e-money paid in by
lients, or transfer the e-money aumulated so far to agent .
PerTiMo uses timers in order to impose deadlines on the exeution of om-
muniations and migrations. Moreover, proesses need to posses appropriate
aess permissions in order to send and reeive information. Table 1 provides a
shemati depition of three possible stages of the evolution of the TravelShop
system.
This paper is a revised and extended version of the onferene paper [11℄, and
is strutured in the following way. We rst desribe the syntax and semantis
of PerTiMo. After that we introdue a sheme aimed at identifying situations
when a proess enters a state in whih it annot ommuniate with other pro-
esses due to not having suient aess permissions. We then show that the
developed sheme is sound and omplete for ensuring safety of ommuniation
for networks of migrating proesses. In this way we address our main goal whih
is to treat the serious problem of aess permission in a formal way.
Throughout the paper we use the standard mathematial notation. In parti-
ular, we use x to denote a nite tuple (x1, . . . , xk) whenever it does not lead to
a onfusion, and if X is a tuple of sets (X1, . . . , Xk) then we use
∏
X to denote
the Cartesian produt X1× . . .×Xk. We assume that the reader is familiar with
the basi onepts of proess algebras [17℄.
2 PerTiMo
We start by desribing the syntax and semantis of PerTiMo whih uses timing
onstraints allowing, for example, to speify what is the time window for a
proess to move from one loation to another. For example, a timer (suh as
∆5 ) of a migration ation go∆5home indiates that the proess will move to
the loation home within 5 loal time units. It is also possible to wait for a
ommuniation on a hannel; if a ommuniation ation does not happen before a
deadline, the waiting proess gives up and swithes its operation to an alternative
mode. For example, a timer (suh as ∆4 ) of an output ation a∆4 ! 〈13 〉 makes
the hannel available for loal ommuniation only for the period of 4 time units.
2.1 Syntax
In order to enode the desired features of PerTiMo, we assume a set of nite
types whih inludes Loc (a set of loations) and Chan (a set of ommuniation
hannels). We will also use variables and a nite set of proess identiers, Id ,
suh that eah id ∈ Id has the arity mid .
To ommuniate over a hannel at a given network loation, the sender pro-
ess should have a `put' aess permission, and the reeiving proess a `get' aess
permission. In general, the set of aess permissions Γ of a proess is a subset
of the overall set of aess permissions:
AccPerm
df
= {put, get} × Chan × Loc .
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a: initial onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
130
client
100
agent
60
update
110
special
flightinfo
90
bank
saleinfo
10
till
b: intermediate onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
130
client
100
agent update
110
special
flightinfo
60
bank
saleinfo
10
till
: nal onguration
home travelshop standard special bank
70
client
170
agent
update
110
special
flightinfo
60
bank
saleinfo
0
till
Fig. 1. Three snapshots of the evolution of the running example. In the initial ongu-
ration we indiated the intended migration paths of three proesses. The intermediate
onguration illustrates the phase of the evolution after some initial movements of
the lient and after updating the seond ight prie. The nal onguration shows the
state of the system after a suessful payment has been made; the total sum of e-money
owned by the lient (70 ), agent (170 ) and till (0 ) is exatly the same as the sum at
the beginning of the evolution when the lient has 130 , agent 100 and till 10 . Note
that the hannels used by proesses to ommuniate information are not shown.
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We use the notation get〈a@l〉 to denote an aess permission (get, a, l) ∈ AccPerm
and put〈a@l〉 to denote (put, a, l) ∈ AccPerm. Intuitively, we work with aess
permissions to sokets where l represents an IP address and a represents a om-
muniation port.
Inspired primarily by the seurity issues of network migration, we allow aess
permissions of a proess to hange while moving from one loation to another.
To model this, we use the following four basi aess permission modiation
operations:
put+a@l get
+
a@l put
−
a@l get
−
a@l
where l is a loation and a is a ommuniation hannel. The rst two (put+a@l
and get+a@l) add aess permissions, while the latter two (put
−
a@l and get
−
a@l)
remove aess permissions. For instane,
put+a@l(Γ ) = Γ ∪ {put〈a@l〉} .
Then an aess permission modiation operation is either the identity onAccPerm ,
or a omposition of some basi aess permission modiation operations suh
that if put+a@l is used in the omposition then put
−
a@l is not used (giving and at
the same time removing an aess permission does not make sense). For instane,
get+a@l ◦ put
−
b@l′(Γ ) = Γ ∪ {get〈a@l〉} \ {put〈b@l
′〉} .
For a given network, we then speify what are the hanges to the aess permis-
sion sets of proesses migrating from one loation to another. This is speied
as a mapping apm whih, for eah pair of loations, returns a permission mod-
iation operation. Hene, if a proess with the urrent aess permissions Γ
moves from loation l to loation l′, its new set of aess permissions beomes
apm(l, l′)(Γ ).
The syntax of PerTiMo is given in Table 1, where P are proesses, PP
proesses with (aess) permissions, and N networks. Moreover, for eah id ∈ Id ,
there is a unique proess denition of the form:
id(u1, . . . , umid : X
id
1 , . . . , X
id
mid
)
df
= Pid , (1)
where the ui's are distint variables playing the role of parameters, and the X
id
i 's
are types. Proesses of the form stop and id(v) are alled primitive.
In Table 1, it is assumed that:
 a ∈ Chan is a hannel, and t ∈ N ∪ {∞} is a time deadline;
 eah vi is an expression built from values, variables and allowed operations;
 eah ui is a variable and Xi a type;
 l is a loation or a variable, and Γ a set of ation permissions; and
 s is a speial symbol used to express that a proess is temporarily stalled.
The only variable binding onstrut is a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ whih binds
the variables u within P (but not within P ′); we use fv (P ) to denote the free
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Proesses P ::= a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else P ′ p (output)
a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ p (input)
go
∆t l then P p (move)
P |P ′ p (parallel)
stop p (termination)
id(v) p (reursion)
sP (stalling)
Proesses with PP ::= P : Γ p PP |PP ′
aess Permissions
Networks N ::= l [[PP ]] p N |N ′
Shorthand notation:
a ! 〈v〉 → P will be used to denote a∆∞ ! 〈v〉 then P else stop
a ? (u:X) → P will be used to denote a∆∞ ? (u:X) then P else stop .
Table 1. PerTiMo syntax. The length of u is the same as that of X, and the length
of v in id(v) is mid .
variables of a proess P (and similarly for typed proesses and networks). For a
proess denition as in (1), we assume that
fv(Pid ) ⊆ {u1, . . . , umid}
and so the free variables of Pid are parameter bound. Proesses are dened up
to the alpha-onversion, and {v/u, . . .}P is obtained from P by replaing all
free ourrenes of a variable u by v, possibly after alpha-onverting P in order
to avoid name apture. Moreover, if v and u are tuples of the same length
then {v/u}P = {v1/u1, v2/u2, . . . , vk/uk}P . A network N is well-formed if the
following hold:
 there are no free variables in N ;
 there are no ourrenes of the speial symbol s in N ; and
 assuming that id is as in reursive equation (1), for every id(v) ourring
in N or on the right hand side of any reursive equation, the expression vi
is of type X idi (where we use the standard rules of determining the type of
an expression by taking into aount the types assoiated with the binding
variables ui in input onstruts and reursive denitions).
A proess a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else P ′ attempts to send a tuple of values v
over the hannel a for t loal time units. If suessful, it then ontinues as
proess P , and otherwise it ontinues as the alternative proess P ′. Similarly,
a∆t ? (u:X) then P else P ′ is a proess that attempts for t time units to input
a tuple of values of types given by X and substitute them for the variables u.
Mobility is implemented by proesses like go∆t l then P whih moves from the
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TravelShop
df
=
home [[ client(130 ) : ∅ ]] |
travelshop [[ agent(100 ) : {put〈flight@travelshop〉} | update(60 ) : ∅ ]] |
standard [[ flightinfo(110 , special ) : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard〉} ]] |
special [[ saleinfo(90 , bank) : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[ till(10 ) : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
apm(home, travelshop)
df
= get+flight@travelshop
apm(travelshop , standard )
df
= get+info@standard
apm(travelshop , special )
df
= put+info@special
apm(standard , special )
df
= get+info@special ◦ get
−
info@standard
apm(special , bank)
df
= put+pay@bank ◦ get
−
info@special ◦ get
−
pay@bank
apm(travelshop , bank)
df
= get+pay@bank
Table 2. PerTiMo network modelling the running example together with the relevant
aess permission modiation operations (those omitted are all equal to the identity
mapping on AccPerm).
urrent loation to the loation given by l within t time units. Note that sine
l an be a variable, and so its value is assigned dynamially through ommu-
niation with other proesses, migration ations support a exible sheme for
movement of proesses from one loation to another. One might wonder why a
proess an delay migration to another loation. The point is that by allowing
this we an model in a simple way non-determinism in the movement of pro-
esses whih is, in general, outside the ontrol of a system designer. Thus the
timer in this ase indiates the upper bound on the time it takes for a proess
to migrate to a new loation.
A network l [[P : Γ ]] speies a proess P with the aess permissions Γ
running at the loation l. Finally, proess expressions of the form sP repre-
sent a purely tehnial devie whih is used in our formalisation of strutural
operational semantis of PerTiMo; intuitively, it speies a proess P whih is
temporarily stalled and so annot exeute any ation.
Running Example The speiation of the running example whih aptures
the essential features of the senario desribed in the introdution is given in Ta-
bles 2 and 3. We assume that Loc = {home, travelshop, standard , special , bank}
and Chan = {info,flight , pay}. Table 2 shows the proess network TravelShop
modelling the senario, as well as the aess permission modiation operations
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whih are applied to the typed proess expressions when they move around the
ve nodes of the network. Table 3 gives all the neessary proess denitions.
1
client(init:eMoney)
df
=
go
∆5 travelshop → flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) →
go∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) →
go
∆3 specialoffer → info ? (p2 :eMoney , paying :Loc) →
go
∆6 paying → pay ! 〈min{p1 , p2}〉 →
go
∆4 home → client(init −min{p1 , p2})
agent(balance:eMoney)
df
=
flight ! 〈standard〉 → go∆10 bank →
pay ? (profit :eMoney) → go∆12 travelshop →
agent(balance + profit)
update(saleprice :eMoney)
df
=
go
∆0 special → info ! 〈saleprice〉 → stop
flightinfo(price : eMoney ,next : Loc)
df
=
info ! 〈price,next〉 → flightinfo(price, next)
saleinfo(price : eMoney ,next : Loc)
df
=
info∆10 ? (newprice:eMoney)
then saleinfo(newprice ,next)
else info ! 〈price ,next〉 → saleinfo(price,next)
till(cash :eMoney)
df
=
pay∆1 ? (newpayment :eMoney)
then till(cash + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈cash〉 then till(0 ) else till(cash)
Table 3. Proess denitions for the running example.
2.2 Operational Semantis
The rst omponent of the operational semantis of PerTiMo is the strutural
equivalene ≡ on networks, similar to that used in [5℄. It is the smallest ongru-
1
Regarding the flightinfo proess, it is worth noting that we an dene strategies of
migration based on timing; for instane, round-robin et.
PerTiMo: A Model of Spatial Migration with Safe Aess Permissions 9
ene suh that the equalities (Eq1Eq6) in Table 4 hold. Its role is to rearrange
a network in order apply the ation rules whih are also given in Table 4.
Using (Eq1Eq6) one an always transform a given network N into a nite
parallel omposition of networks of the form:
l1 [[P1:Γ1 ]] | . . . | ln [[Pn:Γn ]] (2)
suh that no proess Pi has the parallel omposition operator at its topmost
level. Eah sub-network li [[Pi:Γi ]] will be alled a omponent of N , the set of all
omponents will be denoted by comp(N), and the parallel omposition (2) will
be alled a omponent deomposition of the network N . Note that these notions
are well-dened sine omponent deomposition is unique up to the permutation
of the omponents (see also Remark 1 below).
In addition to the rules of the strutural ongruene, Table 4 introdues two
kinds of ation rules:
N
λ
−→ N ′ and N
√
l−→ N ′ .
The former is an exeution of an ation λ, and the latter a time step. In the rule
(Time), N 6→l means that no l-ation λ (i.e., an ation of the form id@l or l ⊲ l
′
or @l or a〈v〉@l) an be applied to N . Moreover, φl(N) is obtained by taking the
omponent deomposition of N and simultaneously replaing all omponents of
the form:
l [[ a∆tω then P else Q : Γ ]]
where ω stands for ! 〈v〉 or ? (u:X), by l [[Q : Γ ]] if t = 0, and otherwise by:
l [[ a∆t−1ω then P else Q : Γ ]] .
After that all the ourrenes of the speial symbol s are erased. Note that
derementing the values of timers in the migration onstrut is taken are of by
the (Wait) rule.
Intuitively, the way networks of loated proesses evolve an be regarded as
onforming to the maximally onurrent paradigm sine one exeutes as many
as possible ations before applying a time derement whih signies the passage
of a unit of time.
Remark 1. Component deomposition is unique sine the rule (Call) treats
reursive denitions as funtion alls whih take a unit of time. Another onse-
quene of suh a treatment is that it is impossible to exeute an innite sequene
of ation steps without exeuting any time steps. Both these properties would
not hold if, instead of an ation rule (Call), we would have a strutural rule of
the form l [[ id(v) : Γ ]] ≡ l [[ {v/u}Pid : Γ ]].
Properties of Operational Semantis We now disuss properties of the
operational semantis dened in Table 4 aiming, in partiular, at apturing on-
urreny in the exeuted ation moves. We start by showing that one annot
exeute an unbounded sequene of ation moves without exeuting any time
moves.
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(Eq1) N |N ′ ≡ N ′ |N
(Eq2) (N |N ′) |N ′′ ≡ N | (N ′ |N ′′)
(Eq3) l [[PP |PP ′ ]] ≡ l [[PP ]] | l [[PP ′ ]]
(Eq4) l [[P |Q : Γ ]] ≡ l [[P : Γ |Q : Γ ]]
(Eq5) l [[PP |PP ′ ]] ≡ l [[PP ′ |PP ]]
(Eq6) l [[ (PP |PP ′) |PP ′′ ]] ≡ l [[PP | (PP ′ |PP ′′) ]]
(Call) l [[ id(v) : Γ ]]
id@l
−→ l [[s {v/u}Pid : Γ ]]
(Move) l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]]
l⊲l
′
−→ l′ [[sP : apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ]]
(Wait)
t > 0
l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] @l−→ l [[s go∆t−1 l′ then P : Γ ]]
(Com)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ′ v ∈
∏
X
l [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else Q : Γ | a∆t
′
? (u:X) then P ′ else Q′ : Γ ′ ]]
a〈v〉@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l [[sP : Γ | s {v/u}P ′ : Γ ′ ]]
(Par)
N
λ
−→ N ′
N |N ′′
λ
−→ N ′ |N ′′
(Equiv)
N ≡ N ′ N ′
λ
−→ N ′′ N ′′ ≡ N ′′′
N
λ
−→ N ′′′
(Time)
N 6−→
N
√
l−→ φl(N)
Table 4. Six rules of the strutural equivalene (Eq1-Eq6), and seven ation rules
(Call Move Wait Com Par Equiv Time) of the operational semantis of Per-
TiMo.
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Proposition 1. If N is a network and N
λ1−→ · · ·
λk−→ N ′ then k ≤ |comp(N)|.
Proof. We observe that eah of the omponents of N is involved in generating of
at most one λi (sine the resulting subexpression is bloked by s until the next
time step), and that the generation of eah λi involves at least one omponent
of N . ⊓⊔
If we start with a well-formed network, exeution proeeds through alter-
nating exeutions of time steps and ontiguous sequenes of ations making up
what an be regarded as a maximally onurrent step (note the role of the speial
stalling symbols s). This intuition is reinfored by the following result.
Proposition 2. Let N be a well-formed network. If N
λ1−→ · · ·
λn−→ N ′ then we
also have N
λi1−→ · · ·
λin−→ N ′, for every permutation i1, . . . , in of 1, . . . , n.
Proof. We observe that no omponent is involved in the generation of two λi's
(sine the resulting subexpression is bloked by s until the next time move),
and the exeutions in dierent omponents do not interfere with eah other. ⊓⊔
In view of the last result, an entire omputational step is aptured by a
derivation N
Λ
=⇒ N ′, where Λ = {λ1, . . . , λn} is a nite multiset of l-ations for
some loation l suh that
N
λ1−→ · · ·
λn−→
√
l−→ N ′ .
We also all N ′ diretly reahable from N . In other words, we an apture the
umulative eet of the onurrent exeution of the multiset of ations Λ. We
an also show that the operational semantis does not admit innite branhing.
Proposition 3. There are only nitely many networks diretly reahable from
a given network.
Proof. Eah omponent of a network an be involved in only a single ation.
Moreover, suh a single involvement an only be realized in nitely many ways
(note that in the ase of an input onstrut this follows from the assumed nite-
ness of the types in PerTiMo). Finally, the time evolution is deterministi. ⊓⊔
It is important to stress that the semantial treatment of PerTiMo itself
a ontinuation of the idea developed for TiMo [10℄  goes beyond interleaving
semantis by introduing an expliit representation of maximal onurreny in
the exeution of ations.
Our last result in this setion is that the rules of Table 4 preserve well-
formedness of networks.
Proposition 4. All networks diretly reahable from a well-formed network are
well-formed.
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Proof. Let N be a well-formed network and N
Λ
=⇒ N ′.
Clearly, there are no ourrenes of the speial symbol s in N ′ sine the
funtion φl applied in a time move removes all its ourrenes.
We then observe that N ′ has no free variables. The only two ases in Ta-
ble 4 whih need to be heked are (Call) and (Com). Applying (Call) does
not introdue free variables sine fv(Pid ) ⊆ {u1, . . . , umid} in the reursive def-
inition (1). In an appliation of the (Com) rule v, are the values replaing u
in P ′, and we have fv (P ′) ⊆ {u}. Hene fv ({v/u}P ′) = ∅. In the ase of an
appliation of the φl funtion, we observe that the onstrut:
a∆0 ? (u:X) then P else Q : Γ
binds the variables u within P , but not within Q.
Finally, for every id(v) ourring in N ′, vi is of type X idi whih follows from
the assumed well-formedness of N . ⊓⊔
Running Example Tables 5 and 6 give three exeution steps based on the
senario illustrated in Figure 1. Eah step represents parallel exeution of several
ations, and in Table 5 we indiate only the main rules used in the derivation
of steps. In partiular, six instanes of (Call) are applied in the rst step to
the six proesses whih make up the TravelShop system. In the seond step
(Move) is applied twie, orresponding to the (non-urgent) migration of the
lient from home to travelshop, and the urgent migration of the update proess
from travelshop to special . In the third step, two instanes of (Com) are used: one
to ommuniate the loation of the standard oer (i.e., standard) over hannel
flight at travelshop, and the other to update the speial oer to 60 using the
hannel info at the loation special .
Eah parallel exeution step takes a single unit of loal time and some timers
are deremented by one (for example, the timer ∆3 of hannel info in U0 is
hanged to ∆2 in U1). Other timers whih have expired ause an immediate
migration (see the migration of the update proess in the seond exeution step)
or the seletion of the alternative part of a ommuniation ation (see W1 whih
is replaed by W2 in the third exeution step).
Note that the last network expression derived from TravelShop of Table 5
orresponds to the intermediate onguration shown in Figure 1(b). Note also
that in the pitorial representation of Figure 1(b) we show the home loation,
even though it is not present in the last network expression in Table 5. The
reason is that the client proess has moved to travelshop, and there is at present
no proess residing at home. This situation hanges in the nal onguration in
Figure 1() after client has ompleted its migration and ame bak to its initial
loation.
3 Safe Aess Permissions for Migrating Proesses
In this setion, we attempt to verify that a migrating proess possesses a su-
iently rih set of initial aess permissions suh that whenever later on it at-
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TravelShop


client@home, agent@travelshop, update@travelshop,
flighinfo@standard , saleinfo@special, till@bank


======================================================================⇒ 6 × (Call)
home [[ go∆5 travelshop → P0 : ∅ ]] |
travelshop [[Q0 : {put〈flight@travelshop〉} | go
∆0 special → R0 : ∅ ]] |
standard [[U0 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ V0 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W0 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
{home ⊲ travelshop, travelshop ⊲ special}
======================================================================⇒ 2 × (Move)
travelshop [[flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) → P1:{get〈flight@travelshop〉} |
flight ! 〈standard 〉 → Q1:{put〈flight@travelshop〉} ]] |
standard [[U1 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ info∆9 ? (newprice : eMoney)
→ V1 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special 〉} |
info ! 〈60 〉 → stop : {put〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W1 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
{flight〈standard〉@travelshop, info〈60〉@special}
======================================================================⇒ 2 × (Com)
travelshop [[P2:{get〈flight@travelshop〉} | Q1:{put〈flight@travelshop〉} ]] |
standard [[U2 : {put〈info@standard 〉, get〈info@standard 〉} ]] |
special [[ V2 : {put〈info@special〉, get〈info@special〉} | stop : {put〈info@special〉} ]] |
bank [[W2 : {put〈pay@bank〉, get〈pay@bank〉} ]]
Table 5. Three exeution steps for the running example (see Table 6).
tempts to ommuniate over a hannel, it has the required safe aess permission.
While doing so, we need to take into aount that migrating proesses have their
aess permission sets modied aording to the mapping apm . If we sueed,
then an important seurity problem related to migration and aess permissions
is solved in the sense that never an unauthorised attempt to ommuniate over
a hannel happens during migration of proesses in a network.
In what follows, we use judgements of the form
Γ ⊢l P
to mean that a single-omponent network l [[P :Γ ]] has safe aess permissions.
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P0 = flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) → P1
P1 = go
∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) →
go
∆3 specialoffer → info ? (p2 :eMoney , paying :Loc) →
go
∆6 paying → pay ! 〈min{p1 , p2}〉 →
go
∆4 home → client(130 −min{p1 , p2})
P2 = {standard/standardoffer }P1
Q0 = flight ! 〈standard 〉 → Q1
Q1 = go
∆10 bank →
pay ? (profit :eMoney) → go∆12 travelshop → agent(100 + profit)
R0 = info ! 〈60 〉 → stop
U0 = info
∆3
! 〈110 , special 〉 → flightinfo(110 , special)
U1 = info
∆2
! 〈110 , special 〉 → flightinfo(110 , special)
U2 = flightinfo(110 , special )
V0 = info
∆10
? (newprice :eMoney) then saleinfo(newprice , bank)
else info ! 〈90 , bank〉 → saleinfo(90 , bank)
V1 = info
∆9
? (newprice :eMoney) then saleinfo(newprice , bank)
else info ! 〈90 , bank〉 → saleinfo(90 , bank)
V2 = saleinfo(60 , bank)
W0 = pay
∆1
? (newpayment :eMoney) then till(10 + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
W1 = pay
∆0
? (newpayment :eMoney) then till(10 + newpayment)
else pay∆2 ! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
W2 = pay
∆2
! 〈10 〉 then till(0 ) else till(10 )
Table 6. Proess expressions used in Table 5.
Given a set of loations Loc together with the apm mapping as well a proess
P and loation l, we want to devise typing rules for heking that a set of
aess permissions Γ satises Γ ⊢l P . However, this may be impossible due to
onits between aess permission modiations resulting from migrations, and
the subsequent ommuniation ations. For example, if
P = go∆0 l′ then a∆1 ! 〈1〉 → stop
and apm(l, l′) = put−a@l′ then there is no Γ suh that Γ ⊢l P .
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If P does not involve reursive denitions, the task is relatively straight-
forward. One just needs to follow the syntati struture of the proess and
inrementally derive Γ . Dealing with reursive proess denitions is more om-
pliated and the solution we propose onsists in unfolding a reursive proess
expression suiently many times to over all migration possibilities. For all
id ∈ Id , n ≥ 0 and v ∈
∏
X
id
, the n-th unfolding of id(v) is given by:
id(v)↑n df=
{
stop if n = 0
P if n > 0
where P is obtained from {v/u}Pid by replaing eah subexpression of the form
id ′(w) with id ′(w)↑n−1. Moreover, stop↑n df= stop.
The derivation rules for judgements Γ ⊢l P are given in Table 7. The onstant
H in the rule (TRe) for reursive proesses is:
H
df
= 2 · |Loc| ·
(
1 +
∑
id∈Id
|X id1 | · . . . · |X
id
mid
|
)
.
The value of the above onstant omes from rather tehnial onsiderations
needed to prove results onerning safe aess permissions of proess networks
presented later on.
(TSub)
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ Γ ′ ⊢l P
Γ ⊢l P
(TStop) ∅ ⊢l stop
(TMove)
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ P
Γ ⊢l go
∆t l′ then P
(TOut)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ Γ ⊢l P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ⊢l a
∆t
! 〈v〉 then P else Q
(TIn)
get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∀v ∈
∏
X : Γ ⊢l {v/u}P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ⊢l a
∆t
? (u:X) then P else Q
(TRe)
Γ ⊢l id(v)
↑H
Γ ⊢l id(v)
(TPar)
Γ ⊢l P Γ ⊢l Q
Γ ∪ Γ ⊢l P |Q
Table 7. Derivation rules for proesses with safe aess permissions.
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The (TMove) rule onerns a migration from loation l to l′. In order to have
l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] with safe aess permissions, it is neessary to have
l′ [[P : Γ ′ ]] with safe aess permissions after applying the aess permission
modiation to Γ when moving from l to l′ (note that Γ ′ = apm(l, l′)(Γ )). The
rule (TOut) simply requires that a proess attempting to send a message along
a hannel a should possess the aess permission put〈a@l〉. Similarly, the rule
(TIn) requires that a proess attempting to reeive a message along a hannel
a should possess the aess permission get〈a@l〉; moreover, after reeiving this
message it should have safe aess permissions in terms of aess permissions
with the urrent Γ irrespetive of the values arried by that message.
We have dened what it means to have safe aess permissions in the ase
of a single-omponent network. In the general ase, a network N has safe aess
permissions if eah of its omponents has safe aess permissions. These two def-
initions are onsistent in the sense that Γ ⊢l P i Γ ⊢l Pi, for every omponent
network l [[Pi:Γ ]] of a single-omponent network l [[P :Γ ]], whih follows from the
rule (TPar).
Properties of Networks with Safe Aess Permissions Our rst main
result will be that being a network with safe aess permissions is preserved over
the evolutions dened by our operational semantis. Its formulation and proof
are preeded by a series of auxiliary denitions and results.
Throughout the rest of this setion we will assume that the right hand side
Pid of eah reursive denition (1) is either a primitive proess (i.e., it is of the
form Pid = stop or Pid = id
′(w)) or Pid uses exatly one appliation of one
of the proess operators to some primitive proess(es). (We will later argue in
Remark 2 at the end of this setion that suh an assumption does not diminish
the generality of our results.) Moreover, we will use signed aess permissions
of the form α+ and α−. Intuitively, α+ orresponds to adding of the aess
permission α, and α+ orresponds to its withdrawal.
The auxiliary results that we now develop will refer to an ar-labelled graph
GId whih enodes potential unfoldings of proess identiers, dened thus:
 The vertex set of GId is: ({stop} ∪ {id(v) | id ∈ Id ∧ v ∈
∏
X
id}) × Loc,
and so there are exatly
H
2
verties.
 There are no ars outgoing from the verties in {stop} × Loc.
 For eah vertex q = (id(v), l) the outgoing ars depend on the right hand
side Pid of the reursive denition for id , as follows:
• If {v/u}Pid = stop then there is an ∅-labelled ar from q to (stop, l).
• If {v/u}Pid = id
′(w) then there is an∅-labelled ar from q to (id ′(w), l).
• If {v/u}Pid = P
′ |P ′′ then there are ∅-labelled ars from q to (P ′, l)
and (P ′′, l).
• If {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
! 〈v〉 then P ′ else P ′′ then there are ars (labelled
by {put〈a@l〉}) from q to (P ′, l) and (P ′′, l).
• If {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
? (z:Y ) then P ′ else P ′′ then there are ars (labelled
by {get〈a@l〉}) from q to (P ′′, l) and ({w/z}P ′, l), for every w ∈
∏
Y .
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• If {v/u}Pid = go
∆t l′ then P ′ then there is an ar from q to (P ′, l′)
labelled by:
A = {α+ | α ∈ apm(l, l′)(∅)} ∪ {α− | α /∈ apm(l, l′)(AccPerm)} .
Note that this means that if α+ ∈ A (or α− ∈ A) then α ∈ apm(l, l′)(Γ )
(resp. α /∈ apm(l, l′)(Γ )), for every set of aess permissions Γ .
In what follows, for any path π starting at a vertex q′ and an ar from q to
vertex q′ (note that there is at most one suh ar), we denote by 〈q, q′〉 ◦ π the
path obtained by rst following this ar and then π.
Intuitively, GId enodes hanges of the set of aess permissions of a migrating
proess (using α+ and α−) and the required aess permissions of a ommuni-
ating proess (using α), while the direted paths orrespond to the potential
evolutions of a migrating proess. Some of these paths orrespond to potentially
unsafe situation, as desribed next.
Let α be an aess permission. Then a direted path π in GId of the form:
q
A1−→ q1
A2−→ · · ·
An−→ qn (3)
is alled
 an α-path if α ∈ An and α, α
+, α− /∈ Ai for i = 0, . . . , n− 1.
 an α−α-path if α ∈ An and there is m < n suh that α− ∈ Am and
α, α+, α− /∈ Ai for i = m+ 1, . . . , n− 1.
We denote this by πnα(q) and π
n
α−α
(q), respetively. Then, for every set of aess
permissions Γ , every vertex q of GId , and every n ≥ 0,
Γ n q
if πn
α−α
(q) = ∅ and πnα(q) = ∅ =⇒ α ∈ Γ , for every aess permission α.
Moreover,
Γ  q
if Γ n q for all n ≥ 0. Intuitively, by writing Γ  q, where q = (id(v), l),
we would like to apture the fat that the omponent l [[ id(v) : Γ ]] has safe
aess permissions in any environment made up of other omponents, and sine
its potential evolutions orrespond to the paths starting at q, we an use suh
paths to verify whether the omponent has safe aess permissions. For example,
if there is an α-path starting at q with α /∈ Γ , there is a potential evolution in
whih one of the desendants of id(v) : Γ plaed initially at loation l wants to
ommuniate on a hannel without the neessary aess permission. Similarly,
α−α-paths are indiative of potential attempts to ommuniate on hannels after
losing the neessary aess permissions.
We will link the notion of a omponent having safe aess permissions with
the presene of α-paths and α−α-path in GId .
Lemma 1. Let q = (id(v), l) be a vertex of GId , Γ a set of aess permissions,
α an aess permission, and n ≥ 0.
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1. If {v/u}Pid = id
′(w) then
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ Γ n q′
where q′ = (id ′(w), l).
2. If {v/u}Pid = P
′ |P ′′ then
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′
where q′ = (P ′, l) and q′′ = (P ′′, l).
3. If {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
! 〈v〉 then P ′ else P ′′ then
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′
where q′ = (P ′, l) and q′′ = (P ′′, l).
4. If {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
? (z:Y ) then P ′ else P ′′ then
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′′ ∧ ∀q′ ∈ Q : Γ n q′
where q′′ = (P ′′, l) and Q = {({w/z}P ′, l) | w ∈
∏
Y }.
5. If {v/u}Pid = go
∆t l′ then P ′ then
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ Γ \ {α | α− ∈ A} ∪ {α | α+ ∈ A} n q′
where A is the label of the ar from q to q′, and q′ = (P ′, l′).
Proof. (1) From the denition of GId we obtain that:
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′)}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} .
Hene Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ Γ n q′.
(2) From the denition of GId we obtain that:
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′)} ∪ {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′′)}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} ∪ {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′′)} .
Hene Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′.
(3) From the denition of GId we obtain that, for α 6= put〈a@l〉:
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′)} ∪ {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′′)}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} ∪ {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′′)} .
Moreover, if α = put〈a@l〉 then
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′〉, 〈q, q′′〉}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} ∪ {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′′)} .
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Hene Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′.
(4) From the denition of GId we obtain that, for α 6= get〈a@l〉:
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′′)} ∪
⋃
q′∈Q{〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′)}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′′)} ∪
⋃
q′∈Q{〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} .
Moreover, if α = get〈a@l〉 then
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′′〉} ∪ {〈q, q′〉 | q′ ∈ Q}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′′)} ∪
⋃
q′∈Q{〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} .
Hene Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′′ ∧ ∀q′ ∈ Q : Γ n q′.
(5) From the denition of GId we obtain that, for α suh that α
−, α+ /∈ A:
πn+1α (q) = {〈q, q
′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πnα(q
′)}
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)} .
Moreover, if α+ ∈ A, then
πn+1α (q) = ∅
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′)}
and, if α− ∈ A, then
πn+1α (q) = ∅
πn+1
α−α
(q) = {〈q, q′〉 ◦ π | π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′) ∨ π ∈ πnα(q
′)} .
To show the desired equivalene, we denote Γ ′ = Γ\{α | α− ∈ A}∪{α | α+ ∈ A},
and then proeed as follows.
(⇐=) We onsider two ases.
Case 1: π ∈ πn+1α (q) and α /∈ Γ . Then α
−, α+ /∈ A and we have that π = 〈q, q′〉◦π′
for some π′ ∈ πnα(q
′) as well as α /∈ Γ ′.
Case 2: π ∈ πn+1
α−α
(q). Then π = 〈q, q′〉◦π′ and either π′ ∈ πn
α−α
(q′), or π′ ∈ πnα(q
′)
and α− ∈ A and so α /∈ Γ ′.
(=⇒) We onsider two ases.
Case 1: Suppose that π ∈ πn
α−α
(q′). Then 〈q, q′〉 ◦ π′ ∈ πn+1
α−α
(q).
Case 2: Suppose now that π ∈ πnα(q
′) and α /∈ Γ ′. Then α+ /∈ A. Now, if α− ∈ A
then 〈q, q′〉◦π ∈ πn+1
α−α
(q), and if α− /∈ A then 〈q, q′〉◦π ∈ πn+1α (q) and α /∈ Γ . ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. Let q = (P, l) be a vertex of GId , Γ a set of aess permissions, and
n ≥ 0. Then
Γ n q ⇐⇒ Γ ⊢l P
↑n .
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Proof. If P = stop the equivalene follows from the rules (TStop) and (TSub).
Hene we assume that P = id(v) and proeed by indution on n.
In the base ase, n = 0 we have that id(v)↑0 = stop and so the result holds
by the rules (TStop) and (TSub). In the indution step, assuming that the
result holds for n, we proeed by ase analysis to show that it also holds for
n+ 1.
Case 1: {v/u}Pid = go
∆t l′ then P ′. Then, assuming q′ = (P ′, l′):
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ by Lemma 1(5)
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) n q′ ⇐⇒ by ind. hyp. and the stop part
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ P ′↑n ⇐⇒ by TMove
Γ ⊢l′ P
↑n+1 .
Case 2: {v/u}Pid = P
′ |P ′′. Then, assuming q′ = (P ′, l) and q′′ = (P ′′, l):
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ by Lemma 1(2)
Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′ ⇐⇒ by ind. hyp. and the stop part
Γ ⊢l P
′↑n ∧ Γ ⊢l P ′′↑n ⇐⇒ by TPar
Γ ⊢l P
↑n+1 .
Case 3: {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
! 〈v〉 then P ′ else P ′′. Then, assuming q′ = (P ′, l) and
q′′ = (P ′′, l):
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ by Lemma 1(3)
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′ ∧ Γ n q′′ ⇐⇒ by ind. hyp. and the stop part
Γ ⊢l P
′↑n ∧ Γ ⊢l P ′′↑n ⇐⇒ by TOut
Γ ⊢l P
↑n+1 .
Case 4: {v/u}Pid = a
∆t
? (z:Y ) then P ′ else P ′′. Then, assuming q′′ = (P ′′, l)
and Q = {({w/z}P ′, l) | w ∈
∏
Y } and P = {{w/z}P ′ | w ∈
∏
Y }:
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ by Lemma 1(4)
get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ n q′∧
∀q′ ∈ Q : Γ n q′ ⇐⇒ by ind. hyp. and the stop part
get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ∧ Γ ⊢l P
′′↑n∧
∀P ′′′ ∈ P : ⊢l P ′′′↑n ⇐⇒ by TIn
Γ ⊢l P
↑n+1 .
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Case 5: {v/u}Pid = id
′(w). Then, assuming q′ = (id ′(w), l):
Γ n+1 q ⇐⇒ by Lemma 1(1)
Γ n q′ ⇐⇒ by ind. hyp. and the stop part
id ′(w)↑n ⇐⇒ by denition
Γ ⊢l P
↑n+1 .
This onludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let q be a vertex of GId , and Γ a set of aess permissions. Then
Γ H q =⇒ Γ  q .
Proof. Suppose that Γ 6 q. Then there is a path π in GId starting at q and an
aess permission α suh that one of the following two ases holds.
Case 1: α /∈ Γ and π is an α-path as in (3) suh that α ∈ An and α, α
+, α− /∈ Ai
for i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Moreover, we an assume that π is a shortest α-path of this
property.
Then n < H
2
sine
H
2
is the number of verties of GId . Indeed, otherwise we ould
nd 0 ≤ i < j ≤ n− 1 suh that qi = qj (assuming that q0 = q) and delete the
ars in-between qi and qj , reating a stritly shorter α-path starting at q. Hene
Γ 6H q.
Case 2: π is an α−α-path as in (3) suh that α ∈ An and there ism < n satisfying
α− ∈ Am and α, α+, α− /∈ Ai for i = m+1, . . . , n− 1. Moreover, we an assume
that π is a shortest α−α-path of this property.
Then, by using twie an argument similar to that used in Case 1, we an show
that n < 2 · H
2
. Hene Γ 6H q. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. If Γ  q and there is an arrow from q to q′ labelled with A then
Γ ′  q′, where
Γ ′ = Γ \ {α | α− ∈ A} ∪ {α | α+ ∈ A} .
Proof. Suppose that Γ  q. We rst observe that eah path starting at q′ an
be pre-pended by the ar from q to q′. Hene any α−α-path starting at q′ would
give rise to an α−α-path starting at q. Consequently, if Γ ′ 6 q′ then there is
an aess permission α 6∈ Γ ′ and an α-path π starting at q′. The latter means
α+ /∈ A. We now onsider two ases.
Case 1: α− ∈ A. Then 〈q, q′〉 ◦ π is an α−α-path starting at q.
Case 2: α− /∈ A. Then α 6∈ Γ and 〈q, q′〉 ◦ π is an α-path starting at q. ⊓⊔
We are now ready to prove the rst main result of this paper.
Theorem 1 (soundness). If a well-formed network N has safe aess permis-
sions, and N ′ is reahable from N , then N ′ also has safe aess permissions.
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Proof. We only need to show the result assuming that N ′ is diretly reahable
from N . Then the result follows from the denition of the operational semantis
of networks that eah omponent Q′ of N ′ has been derived from some ompo-
nent Q of N in one of the following ways (we only disuss some representative
ases).
Case 1:Q = l [[ id(v) : Γ ]] andQ′ = l [[ {v/u}Pid : Γ ]]. Then we onsider subases
depending on the form of Pid . For example, if {v/u}Pid = go
∆t l′ then id ′(w),
then we have
Γ ⊢l id(v) =⇒ by TRe
Γ ⊢l id(v)
↑H =⇒ by Lemma 2
Γ H (id(v), l) =⇒ by Lemma 3
Γ  (id(v), l) =⇒ by Lemma 4
apm(l, l′)(Γ )  (id ′(w), l′) =⇒
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) H (id ′(w), l′) =⇒ by Lemma 2
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ id ′(w)↑H =⇒ by TRe
apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ id ′(w) =⇒ by TMove
Γ ⊢l go
∆t l′ then id ′(w)
Case 2: Q = l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] and Q′ = l′ [[P : apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ]]. Then, by
TMove, we have:
Γ ⊢l go
∆t l′ then P =⇒ apm(l, l′)(Γ ) ⊢l′ P .
Case 3: Q = l [[ go∆t l′ then P : Γ ]] and Q′ = l [[ go∆t−1 l′ then P : Γ ]]. Then
Q′ has safe aess permissions sine Q has safe aess permissions, and timers
do not have any impat on having safe aess permissions. Similar onlusions
apply to the other two ases of derementing timers. ⊓⊔
Our seond main result is that in a network with safe aess permissions
there is no attempt to aess a ommuniation hannel without an appropriate
aess permission. This result should be seen as a justiation of our interest in
the notion of networks with safe aess permissions.
Theorem 2 (safety of ommuniations). Let N be a well-formed network
with safe aess permissions.
l [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else Q : Γ ]] ∈ comp(N) implies put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ
l [[ a∆t ? (u:X) then P else Q : Γ ]] ∈ comp(N) implies get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ .
Proof. The result follows from the fat that the nal stages of the derivation of
the judgements in these ases onsist of appliations of the orresponding rules
(TOut) and (TIn), possibly followed by some appliations of the rule (TSub)
(whih an only add aess permissions and never remove any). ⊓⊔
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Our third main result is that the notion of being a network with safe aess
permissions is omplete in the sense that a network without safe aess per-
missions an always be plaed in an environment whih reveals its potential to
breah safety of interproess ommuniation.
Theorem 3 (soundness). Let N = l [[P : Γ ]] be a well-formed network suh
that Γ 6⊢l P . Then there is a well-formed network N
′
with safe aess permis-
sions and a well-formed network N ′′ reahable from N |N ′ suh that one of the
following holds:
 There is at least one omponent l′ [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P ′ else P ′′ : Γ ′ ]] of N ′′
suh that put〈a@l′〉 /∈ Γ ′.
 There is at least one omponent l′ [[ a∆t ? (u:X) then P ′ else P ′′ : Γ ′ ]] of
N ′′ suh that get〈a@l′〉 /∈ Γ ′.
Proof (Sketh). We an assume that P = id(v). Sine Γ 6⊢l P , there is an α
−α-
path originating at q = (id(v), l), or an α−α-path originating at q and α /∈ Γ . We
an then simulate the exeution of N following the path leading to a problem. All
we need to do is provide the neessary proesses ommuniating with P waiting
at appropriate loations. ⊓⊔
We an then onlude that in this paper we developed a sound and omplete
system for ensuring safety of ommuniation for networks of migrating proesses.
Remark 2. We assumed above a simple form of reursive denitions. However,
this does not diminish the generality of the proposed method sine we an always
proeed as follows. First, we transform all reursive denition into the simple
form using additional proess identiers and reursive denitions. Then we apply
our proedures to hek the safe aess permissions for the modied reursive
denitions. If the answer is `no', we know that the network with the original
reursive denitions fails to satisfy Theorem 3 as the transformation does not
aet this kind of result. Similarly, the answer `yes' implies that the original
system satises Theorem 3. As a result, all three main results an be reovered
in the general ase as well.
It is worth noting that the transformation we just desribed does aet the
operational semantis, but in a way whih is harmless from the point of view of
heking safe aess permissions. ⊓⊔
(Com')
Γ 6= wt⇒ put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ Γ ′ 6= wt⇒ get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ′ v ∈
∏
X
l [[ a∆t ! 〈v〉 then P else Q : Γ | a∆t
′
? (u:X) then P ′ else Q′ : Γ ′ ]]
a〈v〉@l
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ l [[sP : Γ | s {v/u}P ′ : Γ ′ ]]
Table 8. Modied rules of the operational semantis.
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Simplifying the Operational Semantis As an immediate orollary of The-
orem 2, for a network with safe aess permissions, it is possible to simplify
the operational rule for proess ommuniation. More preisely, if we onsider a
network with safe aess permissions, we may delete in rule (Com) the preon-
ditions
put〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ and get〈a@l〉 ∈ Γ ′,
and exeute the network aording to the rules in Tables 4 with and without the
modied rule (Com). Then we obtain equivalent derivation systems. In other
words, for networks with safe aess permissions one an separate all onerns
related to aess permissions from other behavioural aspets (for example, dead-
lok analysis or redundant ode detetion), allowing muh more eient property
veriation.
Following further this idea and making it more preise, we an onsider net-
works in whih only some omponent networks have safe aess permissions.
For suh omponents, we an ignore all the aspets relating to aess permis-
sions, but keep them unhanged for those omponent networks whih are do not
have safe aess permissions. In more onrete terms, we an introdue a spe-
ial dummy aess permission set wt to indiate that a judgement of the form
Γ ⊢l P an be established, and use l [[P : wt ]] in the initial desription of the
system instead of l [[P : Γ ]]. After that we need to make some adjustments to
the rules of operational semantis, by re-dening the (Com) rule, as shown in
Table 8. Moreover, apm(l, l′)(wt) = wt. We then obtain the following result. If
we onsider a network and replae all omponents with safe aess permissions
l [[P : Γ ]] by l [[P : wt ]] and run the resulting network aording to the rules
in Tables 4 and 8, then we obtain derivation systems whih is strongly bisimi-
lar [17℄ to that of the original network. In the extreme ase, when all omponent
networks have safe aess permissions, we an simply forget about aess per-
missions when analyzing other aspets of network behaviour. What is ruial is
that suh modiations an lead to great redutions in the size of the state spae
of the resulting system.
Running Example Below we show an amended version of the network mod-
elling our running example after taking into aount that some of the proesses
have safe aess permissions, and dropping the wt symbols whih are impliit.
TravelShop′ df=
home [[ client(130 ):∅ ]] | travelshop [[ agent(100 ) | update(60 ) ]] |
standard [[flightinfo(110 , special ) ]] | special [[ saleinfo(90 , bank) ]] |
bank [[ till(10 ) ]]
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For example, we observe that ∅ ⊢travelshop update(60 ) sine we have the
following derivation:
∅ ⊢special stop by (TStop)
{put〈info@special〉 ⊢special stop by (TSub)
{put〈info@special〉 ⊢special info ! 〈60 〉 → stop by (TOut)
∅ ⊢travelshop go
∆0 special → info ! 〈60 〉 → stop by (TMove)
Note that info ! 〈60 〉 → stop in the third line above is in fat
info∆∞ ! 〈60 〉 then stop else stop .
One may observe that ∅ 6⊢home client(130 ) sine this proess is of the form
go∆5 travelshop → flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) →
go∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) → P
and so we must have
{get〈flight@travelshop〉} ⊢travelshop
flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) →
go∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) → P
and so we must have
{get〈flight@travelshop〉} ⊢travelshop
go∆4 bank → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) → P
and so we must have
{get〈flight@travelshop〉} ⊢bank info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) → P
This means that we annot proeed any further sine
get〈info@bank〉 /∈ {get〈flight@travelshop〉} .
Note however, that
{get〈info@standard〉, get〈info@special〉, put〈pay@bank〉} ⊢home client(130 )
4 Coordination via Timers
One of the primary appliations of timers is the oordination of the migration
of proesses. For instane, we may hange the denition of a lient proess so
that it aptures urgeny in the wish to omplete the transation, by insisting
that the seond oer is obtained immediately (the urgeny is expressed by the
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timer ∆0 ); if this does not happen, the outome of the visit to the travel shop
is deided only on the basis of the rst oer:
client ′(init:eMoney) df=
go∆5 travelshop → flight ? (standardoffer :Loc) →
go∆4 standardoffer → info ? (p1 :eMoney , specialoffer :Loc) →
go∆3 specialoffer then → info∆0 ? (p2 :eMoney , paying :Loc) then
go∆0 paying → pay ! 〈min{p1 , p2}〉 →
go∆0 home → client(init−min{p1 , p2})
else
go∆0 bank → pay ! 〈p1 〉 →
go∆0 home → client(init− p1 )
5 Conlusions and Related Work
We introdued a distributed proess algebra with proesses able to migrate be-
tween dierent loations and timing onstraints used to ontrol migration and
ommuniation. We use loal loks and loal maximal parallelism of ations.
Proesses have appropriate aess rights to ommuniate; the aess permissions
are dynami and an hange. We have provided an operational semantis of this
model, and investigated the safety of ommuniation and migration in terms of
aess permissions. While we are not aware of any approah ombining all these
aspets regarding mobility with timing onstraints, loal loks, and dynami
aess permission mehanism, our work is related to a large body of literature
using proess algebra in (type-based) seurity. Several systems enompass var-
ious forms of aess ontrol poliies in distributed systems. Among them, the
work on Dpi alulus in [16℄ uses type systems to ontrol statially the aess
to the resoures at the dierent loations of a distributed system. Other related
work on aess ontrol in distributed systems is done in the ontext of the lan-
guage Klaim and its extensions, using type systems that enable the dynami
exhange of aess rights. The paper [9℄ ombines a weak form of information ow
ontrol with typed ryptographi operations to ensure safe stati aess ontrol
and seure network ommuniations. The paper [6℄ use ryptographi operations
and apability types to get a seure implementation of a typed pi-alulus in or-
der to realise various poliies for aessing the ommuniation hannels. None
of these systems, however, uses together mobility as a rst lass itizen on-
trolled by timing onstraints, dynami aspets of the aess permissions, loal
loks and true parallelism. These advantages of the new model an allow to
speify and enfore more diverse and expressive seurity poliies based on aess
permissions. This ould be done in the ontext of designing good programming
language supporting migration in a distributed environment [20℄. On the other
hand, several prototype languages have been designed and experimental imple-
mentations derived from proess aluli like Klaim [5℄ and Aute [19℄. These
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prototype languages did not beome a pratial programming language beause
hard questions revolving mainly around seurity issues. PerTiMo is intended
to help bridging the gap between the existing foundational proess algebras and
forthoming realisti languages. It extends some previous attempts related to
tDpi [12℄ and TiMo [10℄. PerTiMo derives from TiMo model (a simplied
distributed π-alulus with expliit timeouts) presented in [10℄ by adding a type
system in order to express seurity aspets related to aess permissions. The
basi notion of a timeout in TiMo seemed useful and elegant. PerTiMo retains
this notion and, in addition, it inorporates aess permissions in order to pro-
vide formal foundations for seurity problems relating to the adequate protetion
of aess ontrol information in distributed environment.
As related work, we should mention distributed pi-alulus having an expliit
notion of loation, and dealing with stati resoures aess [15℄ by using a type
system. The paper [4℄ studies a π-alulus extension with a timer onstrut, and
then enrihes the timed πt with loations. Other timed extensions of proess al-
gebras have been studied in [3, 13℄. In [8℄ the authors present a typed π-alulus
with groups and group reation in whih eah name belongs to a group. The
rules for good environments ensure that the names and groups delared in an
environment are distint, and that all the types mentioned in an environment
are good. A onsequene of the typing disipline is the ability to preserve se-
rets, namely preventing ertain ommuniations that would leak serets. The
type system is used for regulating the mobile omputation, allowing to partition
the proesses into disjoint groups in order to speify the behaviour of both om-
muniation and mobility. Somehow related to our dynami aess permissions,
[2℄ presents a parametri alulus for proesses exhanging ode whih may on-
tain free variables to be bound by the reeiver's ode (alled open mobile ode).
Type safety is ensured by a ombination of stati and dynami heks of suh
an exhange of open ode. In this way it is possible to express rebinding of ode
in a distributed environment in a relatively simple way.
Deriving onrete implementation from PerTiMo is part of future work,
and the approah presented in this paper is just a rst step in this diretion. In
our future work we plan to extend the urrent model as follows:
 aess permissions to loations to ontrol migrations of proesses;
 seurity levels for migrating proesses to ontrol aess permissions to han-
nels and loations;
 relaxing the synhronisation resulting from the maximally parallel semantis,
by retaining maximal parallelism within eah loation, but allowing loations
to proeed with dierent speed;
 rules for well-typing of values in exhanged messages;
 dening and analysing seurity poliies for aess and migration ontrol; and
 introduing and analysing failures in proess migration.
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